, p. 115) realized at an early point in time that if " [n] othing is true, all is permitted"; as a consequence we find ourselves in a situation in which following too closely on "the heels of truth" will ultimately result in our getting kicked "in the face". Skeptical voices, such as Latour (2004, p. 225) , have drawn the conclusion that the contestability of the practice of critique causes any aspiration for critical inquiry to "run out of steam". After all, the critic and his or her practices, means, strategies, and objectives of critique are not less subject to critique than the objects criticized by him or her (cf. Celikates, 2006, p. 29) . In other words, epistemological relativism accompanied by post-foundational ontology has quite considerable consequences for the capacity of different post-foundational discourse theories -most prominently the Foucaultian and Laclauan theories of discourse -to pursue critical inquiries.
2 However, while Foucault (1997b) and, later on, Butler (2009 Butler ( , 2002 and Koopman (2010) 3 The principal aim of this chapter is to characterize a practice of critique that is consistent with PDA. Our quest proceeds in three consecutive steps: In the first section (Chapter 7.1), we embark on the elucidation of PDA's research programme to distinguish practices of critique permissible and non-permissible with PDA. In a second step (Chapter 7.2), we describe how the "normative critique" on behalf of radical democracy, as it was conducted in earlier accounts on PDA, contradicts PDA's epistemological premises. In the concluding third step (Chapter 7.3), we describe the general characteristics of the practice of "unmasking critique", which from our point of view constitutes the practice of critique that most closely matches the epistemological premises of PDA.
Locating the critical potential
Without any doubt, PDA belongs to the sample of critical theories that provide methodological instructions and means to conduct critical inquiries of the social life. 4 However, there is no consensus with regard to the closer definition of the practice of critique motivated by PDA. For instance, Boucher (2009 ), Brockelman (2003 , Demirović (2007) , and Koch (1993) have argued that PDA cannot provide the epistemological authority presupposed by the project of radical democracy which
